Is A Ceasefire In Ukraine Such A Bad Idea?

As long as it is not confused with a permanent peace.

The World Islands is an independent newsletter, and it can only continue its work with your support. Please ensure to like this post and share it with your friends. If possible, please also consider becoming a paid subscriber.

Controversy erupted last week when reports came out that the United States had a 28-point “peace” plan for Ukraine. The original plan was a Russian draft, negotiated with President Donald Trump for World Peace and Real Estate Steve Witkoff and Vladimir Putin confidante Kirill Dmitriev. Inevitably, it has been dubbed the Dim-Wit plan. The revised draft has been trimmed down to 19, apparently removing the most astonishing points, such as a cap on the size of the Ukrainian military.

The plan is far from a done deal. Axios has published the full text of the 28-point plan, but the 19-point plan remains anticipated.

There are extremely egregious clauses in the original document, such as a constitutional guarantee that Ukraine would not join NATO and a separate clause limiting its armed forces to 600,000.

A separate clause includes a U.S.–Russian pledge to renew their nuclear weapons treaties, effectively extending Russia’s current nuclear superiority over the U.S. and buying time for China to catch up.

But what caught my eye was the territories article:

• Crimea, Luhansk and Donetsk will be recognized as de facto Russian, including by the United States.

• Kherson and Zaporizhzhia will be frozen along the line of contact, which will mean de facto recognition along the line of contact.

• Russia will relinquish other agreed territories it controls outside the five regions.

• Ukrainian forces will withdraw from the part of Donetsk Oblast that they currently control, and this withdrawal zone will be considered a neutral demilitarized buffer zone, internationally recognized as territory belonging to the Russian Federation. Russian forces will not enter this demilitarized zone.

First, de facto is an interesting choice of words, as opposed to de jure. I don’t want to delve into the plan in detail; rather, I want to make a point about “peace.”

Peace requires a change in political conditions when one side imposes its will on the other. As historian Geoffrey Blainey has written, the longest periods of peace often emerge out of decisive victories because they force political change on one side. This plan does not require political change. If, as a result of it, some Russian kills Putin and establishes himself as the new president, claiming that four years of war were for little gains, unlikely as it is, it will be a byproduct.

Even if the plan is fully implemented, Russia and Ukraine will remain at war. As things stand, this is a stalemate, which means that the status quo politics in both countries will survive. The mutual objection to each other might subside over decades, but it is likelier that they will shoot at each other in the future.

Freezing the battle lines might not be a bad idea. Ukraine is dealing with manpower shortages, and President Volodymyr Zelensky has thus far proven unwilling to expand the draft. His reason, at least publicly, is that with too many dead young men, there will be nobody left to build a prosperous Ukraine. The counterargument is that, without men fighting, there will be no Ukraine.

Ukrainians are also tired. War has rarely reached Russian cities, so the Russians are not. Sirens and missiles shot by an enemy cause euphoria, rage militaire, and patriotism at first, but, after four years, those effects give way to exhaustion. Economists expect that the Russian economy will collapse in 2026. Russia is already selling its gold reserves. As bad as it is, societal collapse is much worse, not to mention the possibility of the collapse of the Ukrainian army.

Ukraine and Russia both need a pause. War is a zero-sum game, so the question is, who needs it more? But Ukraine certainly could use it, not a pause forced upon it by a foreign friend, but one it chooses. There was a time three years ago when Ukraine could have reclaimed all of its territory, but the Joe Biden administration failed to meet the moment. A day too late and a dollar too short was the president’s policy, and the level of supplies to Ukraine had a direct and opposite correlation with Jake Sullivan’s blood pressure. Since then, Russia has adapted to the facts and inadequacies of its military, which it was ignorant of. Biden wasted Ukraine’s opportunity. The Trump administration is similarly denying Ukraine its requests for aid, most prominently, Tomahawk missiles. Any new weapon is unlikely to have a serious effect on the direction of the war at this point, though it certainly could help with getting more favorable ceasefire terms. At the very least, it will kill some more Russians. What’s not to love? But any weapon we would give to Ukraine is unlikely to cause a drastic change.

This means that freezing the conflict might not be the worst idea, with the assurance that the United States and the rest of the free world will help it rebuild its economy, boost its military industry, strengthen its armed forces, and allow it to resume the war at a time of its own choosing.

This is the big fear the Ukrainians have about a pause: That it could become permanent. The ceasefire in Korea has become permanent for a variety of reasons. Ukrainians are right not to want the same outcome. In fact, looking at North Korea, they would be insane to wish for it. After all, Russia is not just occupying Ukrainian territory; it is also subjecting millions of Ukrainian citizens to its tyranny, citizens whom the Ukrainian government has a responsibility towards. The problem is that they cannot trust the United States to allow it to resume the war in a year or a decade.

Ceasefire is not peace. You cannot force peace on two sides; only they can force it on one another. This plan, or any similar plan, could achieve a ceasefire, but that should come with an understanding that ceasefires are likelier to break than to hold. Especially with the Russian control of Crimea, southern Ukraine will always be threatened by Russian armed forces that could be supplied through the peninsula.

But then the question is, can the United States find it in itself to pledge to Ukraine that it will support it if Ukraine decides to reclaim its territories? Such a promise, coupled with assurances of future military support, might be the key to convincing Ukraine to agree to a pause.